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The legal conceptualization of unborn generations and their specific rights raises 
important theoretical issues, and constitutes a special challenge to jurisprudence in 
general and legal philosophy in particular. Even the most fundamental and essential 
questions regarding the legal situation of upcoming generations are not settled yet. Are 
future generations capable of being holders of rights or not? And if they are, how can we 
conceptualize their rights? Can we use the conventional modern rights theories, either the 
‘benefit’ or ‘interest’, or the ‘choice’ or ‘will’ theory of rights for that purpose? What does it 
mean and how is it possible to ‘represent’ the rights or interests of future generations? And 
so forth. In my paper I will endeavour to address some of these theoretical questions and 
make an attempt to offer an adequate conceptual framework for their analysis. 
  
 Making Sense of a Nonsense: 





One of the most pressing global problems nowadays is environmental pollution. As 
pollution itself transcends national boundaries, the protection of the environment for 
the future inevitably raises the question of global governance, and invites a deliberate 
reconsideration of the relationship between the state and the international community.1 
Owing to the perception and continually growing consciousness of the responsibility 
of humankind for the natural resources of the earth, as well as for its own descendants, 
in the last decades the idea of sustainability and more particularly the conception of 
sustainable development has received wide acknowledgement and acceptance both by 
the scientific community and the lay public. However, even though the fact that the 
notion of sustainable development seems closely interwoven with the concept of 
intergenerational justice and the protection and representation of the ‘rights’ of future 
generations, until the present day apparently no universal consensus and generally 
accepted theoretical model was formed concerning these commonly evoked ideas. 
As a consequence, the legal conceptualization of unborn generations and their specific 
rights still raises important theoretical issues, and constitutes a special challenge to 
jurisprudence in general and legal philosophy in particular. Even the most fundamental 
and essential questions regarding the legal situation of upcoming generations are not 
settled yet. Are future generations capable of being holders of rights or not? And if they 
are, how can we conceptualize their rights? Can we use the conventional (nineteenth 
                                                        
1 I am grateful to Martin Belov, Péter Cserne and Miklós Könczöl for their helpful comments on this paper. 
 century rooted) modern rights theories, either the ‘benefit’ or ‘interest’, or the ‘choice’ or 
‘will’ theory of rights for that purpose? What does it mean and how is it possible to 
‘represent’ the rights or interests of future generations? What kind of rights or interests 
can be attributed at all to not yet existing people? Can we identify the interests of future 
generations, and if yes, how can we specify them? What exactly do ombudspersons and 
other guardians, e.g. parliamentary representatives of future generations represent, and 
on which grounds can such a representation be based? And so forth. 
In my paper, I will endeavour to address some of these theoretical questions and 
make an attempt to offer an adequate conceptual framework for their analysis. As I will 
focus chiefly on the problem of the conceptualisation of the rights of future generations, 
I will treat questions concerning representation only briefly and indirectly. 
 
 
2. Much ado about nothing? 
 
The principal, crucial problem related to the representation of future generations lies 
within the legal status of future persons: notwithstanding the recognition of the 
potential existence of future generations, no consensus is emerging as to whether future 
generations can possess rights or (international) legal personality, or they have only 
hypothetical interests to be represented. 
There exists much – and various kinds of – scepticism about the conceptualisation of 
the ‘rights of future generations’, and these doubts come up among theoreticians of 
sustainable development and intergenerational justice, too. Joerg Chet Tremmel, for 
example, considers it a sterile effort to seek to determine the exact meaning of the 
concept of ‘rights’, on the grounds that words can and often do change their meanings 
 over time, and, consequently, qualifies the controversy as to whether future persons are 
capable of having ‘rights’ or merely ‘needs’ or ‘interests’ as ‘quite futile’ (Tremmel 2006, 
51–52). Or, it is often argued that the phrase ‘representation of the rights of unborn 
generations’ can become intelligible and useful only if taken as a manifestation of purely 
‘figurative’ or ‘metaphorical’ language.2 There might be an element of truth in these 
statements, but I cannot scrutinize them now in detail. At any rate, for my present 
purposes it suffices to note that I start out from the methodological presupposition that 
legal systems should be based on a coherent conceptual framework, and legal thinking 
cannot be built on wholly arbitrary metaphors. Either lawyers are able to make ‘legal’ 
sense of a notion, or they cannot … 
Furthermore, according to some critics, to found our obligations towards future 
generations upon their correlative rights is to jeopardise the whole project of 
intergenerational justice and equity (Beckerman and Pasek 2001, 13–14).3 This 
objection is easily answerable by saying that those obligations are self-sufficient so that 
they can exist without any corresponding rights. This reply, however, while solving one 
issue, raises another, perhaps even more serious theoretical challenge. If this is so, then 
– just as in the case of animals or plants (let alone rocks and rivers) – we do not 
necessarily need to ‘bestow’ rights on future people to defend present obligations 
concerning them (Gosseries 2008, 450–452). And it may be asked, why is it worth 
undertaking such a doubtful and difficult conceptual manoeuvre? What do we – our 
                                                        
2 See e.g. the Decision 28 of 1994 of the Hungarian Constitutional Court and Saward (2006). 
3 Robert E. Goodin, though highly sympathetic with both ideas, also perceives this danger: ‘Casting the 
question in those terms gives the opponents of intergenerational justice an argumentative advantage. 
They need simply to deny the possibility of purely potential people’s having any claims in terms of rights’ 
(Goodin 1985, 169). 
 succeeding generations – gain in exchange for further inflating the notion and value of 
‘rights’ by postulating future generations’ rights? 
Richard Dagger calls attention to two opposite risks that the proliferation of human 
rights rhetoric carries: it threatens to overwhelm other concepts and considerations on 
the one hand, and to rob the appeal to rights of much of its power on the other (Dagger 
2006, 207). In other, Dworkinian, words: ‘Rights are trumps and if we have more and 
more trumps then we inflate the old (traditional) ones’ (Jakab 2015, 16). 
It is absolutely clear, nevertheless, what future persons would gain if ‘conferred’ with 
rights. The theoretical added value of rights lies in the fact, stresses Axel Gosseries, that 
they serve as a ‘label of significance’: ‘Upgrading an interest to the status of right is a sign 
of its special importance’ (Gosseries 2008, 453). This is so because rights are usually 
deemed to carry much greater moral force than do non-rights-based obligations (Brown 
Weiss 1989, 101). 
As for the practical significance of ascribing rights to unborn generations, trump 
cards with an inflated value are still valuable and stronger than ‘ordinary’ cards, either 
in legal procedures or in political and moral argumentation. While rights are able to 
impose constraint on present people’s behaviour, ‘claims’ or ‘interests’ not clothed in the 
form of a ‘right’ could look frivolous compared to them. But is this extension of rights 
conceptually possible and plausible? 
 
 
3. An old debate: will or interest? 
 
The aim of this paper does not extend to taking sides in the traditional debate between 
the ‘will’ or ‘choice’ theory and the ‘interest’ or ‘benefit’ conception of rights. However, 
 the problem of the rights of future generations might be approached not exclusively 
from the perspective of the question whether we can meaningfully predicate rights of 
potential persons; not only is it possible to test the very concept of the ‘rights of future 
generations’ but also to use those rights as a test case for examining classical theories of 
rights. Perhaps most famously, Neil MacCormick tested – and rejected – the ‘will theory’ 
in this way with children’s rights (see MacCormick 1976). There is a huge difference, 
though, between children’s and future persons’ rights: while both our moral and 
theoretical intuitions tend to dictate, I guess, that children do have rights, at least prima 
facie, it sounds paradoxical to say that non-existent human beings can have them. 
The choice between the ‘will’ and the ‘interest’ theory can surely influence the range 
of potential right-holders. While it seems self-evident that rights can be predicated of 
‘competent’ adult human beings but not of rocks, between these two ‘clear cases’ there is 
a large spectrum of ‘borderline cases’, including e.g. infants, fetuses, dead persons, 
madmen and animals (Feinberg 1974, 44). For the sake of the argument, let us start out 
from the working hypothesis that the choice theory is more persuasive in relation to the 
paradigmatic cases of rights, requiring an autonomous decision from the rights-holder, 
while the interest theory appears more convincing in regard to the borderline cases (see 
Győrfi 2009, 53–56). Now it remains to be verified whether this assumption proves to be 
true in connection with the rights of future generations, which, of course, fall under the 
latter category. That would suggest that the interest theory of rights is more suitable for 
grounding and justifying those rights. 
Certainly, at first glance the will theory does not seem to be at all favourable to the 
rights of unborn generations. According to Hart’s classic formulation of the choice 
conception of rights, the right-holder is a ‘small-scale sovereign’ possessing ‘exclusive 
control, more or less extensive, over another’s person’s duty’ (Hart 1982, 183). 
 Consequently, being a moral agent able to make free choices is a necessary precondition 
for the possession of a right, argues Carl Wellman, and as the essential function of rights 
is to determine the morally justified distribution of  dominion, freedom and control, 
 
the ascription of a moral right to any being incapable of exercising dominion is idle 
and inappropriate. It is idle because there could be no moral purpose in allocating 
dominion to those completely incapable of taking advantage of it in any way; it is 
inappropriate because it would mislead us into imagining that freedom and control 
belong morally to those incapable of acting freely or exercising control. (Wellman 
1995, 107) 
 
On this view, beings incapable of making rational and free decisions, including animals, 
dead persons, future people, fetuses, and even infants, cannot be said to have rights 
(Ekeli 2006, 401). As Hart warns us: 
 
If common usage sanctions talk of the rights of animals or babies it makes an idle 
use of the expression ‘a right,’ which will confuse the situation with other different 
moral situations where the expression ‘a right’ has a specific force and cannot be 
replaced by […] other moral expressions’ (Hart 1955, 181). 
 
If this is so in the case of newborn infants, it is a fortiori true of merely potential persons 
who will become moral agents at an even later date – if at all.  As future people are of 
necessity incapable of either demanding or waiving present persons’ performance of 
correlative duties, they cannot be holders of rights (Steiner 1994, 261). 
Although such uncompromising concern for ‘semantic hygiene’ on the part of many 
proponents of will theory may be, to a certain extent, justified and understandable, it 
 might be suspected that it entails, literally, throwing out the baby with the bathwater. If 
one is willing to affirm children’s rights, but at the same time reluctant to draw the same 
conclusion as MacCormick, namely, that moral considerations provide reasons strong 
enough to repudiate altogether the choice conception of rights on this ground 
(MacCormick 1976, 309), then virtually the only way out left open is to have recourse to 
the principle of potentiality. Nevertheless, as we will see below, this principle cannot be 
extended to the case of future generations. 
Joel Feinberg combines, somewhat surprisingly, a will theory of the nature of rights 
with an interest theory of the capacity to possess rights. While defining ‘right’ as a valid 
claim to something against someone (Feinberg 1970, 253, 256–257, Feinberg 1974, 43), 
Feinberg identifies the class of potential rights-holders with those beings ‘who have (or 
can have) interests’ (Feinberg 1974, 51).4 He gives two reasons for this: 
 
(1) because a right holder must be capable of being represented and it is impossible to 
represent a being that has no interests, and 
(2) because a right holder must be capable of being a beneficiary in his own person, and 
a being without interests is a being that is incapable of being harmed or benefitted, 
having no good or ‘sake’ of its own. (ibid.) 
 
In this theoretical perspective, future generations, fetuses, infants, dead persons and 
animals all fall under the category of beings that ‘can have rights’ (ibid., passim). 
However persuading this line of argument may appear, it gives rise to some 
perplexing questions. First of all, it leaves room for the objection that in order to have a 
                                                        
4 On the question whether this is a contradiction, and if yes, whether and how it can be resolved, see 
particularly Wellman (2005). 
 right, it is not sufficient to have potential interests (to ‘can have’ interests) but to ‘have’ 
actual interests. It is not an accident that standard formulations of the benefit theory 
usually require that ‘right-holders are creatures who have interests’ (Raz 1984a, 204, my 
emphasis). 
Secondly, although a superficial reading might suggest that Feinberg unnecessarily 
complicates the first argument when he arrives to the concept of interest-ownership 
through the notion of representation, in reality, this latter turns out to be a crucial link in 
his overall argumentation. He must place so much emphasis on the representation of 
rights because while ‘paradigmatic’ rights-holders are able to claim their own rights, 
beings that lack moral agency do not have this capacity (Wellman 1995, 117). This is 
why Feinberg insists on the point that all that is needed for the existence of a right is 
that someone be able to press the claim on behalf of the rights-bearer – not that this 
someone personally be the rights-bearer (Dagger 2006, 208).5 
Now the basic problem with this approach is that the notion of representation is itself 
ambiguous. As Wellman highlights, the term ‘representation’ can denote a principal–
agent relationship where the agent is representing the agency – autonomous will – of 
the principal, and it can also refer to a relation between trustee and beneficiary in which 
the trustee is representing the interests of the beneficiary (Wellman 1995, 114–116, 
Wellman 1997, 18). 
‘Representation of agency’ is perfectly suitable for representing rights, but it is, by 
definition, not applicable to beings not possessing moral agency, whereas 
‘representation of interests’ does not necessarily imply rights (Wellman 1995, 118, 120). 
                                                        
5 A similar argument is presented by Robert E. Goodin: ‘After all, court-appointed guardians exercise the 
rights of infants and idiots even though these are just as incapable as future generations of exercising 
choices themselves.’ (Goodin 1985, 170 n. 36) 
 Moreover, this view is at odds with Feinberg’s own concept of right as a ‘valid claim’ 
which appears evidently to entail, as a logical corollary, that only a person capable of 
making claims can become a right-holder. As Feinberg (1970, 251) himself underlines: 
‘The legal power to claim (performatively) one’s right or the things to which one has a 
right seems to be essential to the very notion of a right.’ 
Perhaps the most influential theory of the rights of future generations has been 
developed by Edith Brown Weiss. More precisely, she speaks of ‘planetary’ rights which 
are held by all generations as groups in relation to other generations (intergenerational 
level), as well as by individual members of the present generation (intragenerational 
level) (Brown Weiss 1989, 96–97). She founds the rights of future generations on Joseph 
Raz’s thoroughgoing interest conception of rights according to which an individual or a 
group has a right if and only if an interest (i.e., an aspect of the well-being) of his, her or 
its is a sufficient reason for holding another to be under a duty (see Raz 1984a, 195, Raz 
1984b, 1 and 5). Brown Weiss offers a general definition of rights as follows: 
 
A right is an interest that is juridically protected. It is always associated with a duty 
or obligation. If a person has a right, he or she has an interest that is sufficient 
ground for holding another subject to a duty. (Brown Weiss 1989, 99)  
 
By bringing the notions of interest and well-being into prominence, Brown Weiss is able 
to argue that every human being who has or will have interests in the future can be a 
rights-holder (Ekeli 2006, 399). 
So far so good. We can reach a temporary conclusion which seems to reinforce our 
initial presupposition, viz. that the interest theory of rights is more likely to provide a 
solid foundation for the rights of future generations. We will return to this matter later. 
 Now let us continue our conceptual analysis with a discussion of the philosophical 
problems inherent in attributing rights to future persons. 
 
 
4. Philosophical problems 
 
To ascribe rights to future people is not without danger. As Feinberg acknowledges, one 
easily incurs the charge of “falling into obscure metaphysics, by granting rights to 
remote and unidentifiable beings who are not yet even in existence” (Feinberg 1974, 
65). Within this charge, two separate issues should be differentiated, which are usually 
discussed in the literature on future generations under the rubric of ‘non-existence 




4.1. The non-existence problem 
 
The so-called ‘non-existence problem’ is related to the simple fact that ‘future persons, 
qua future, do not exist now’ (Partridge 2001, 378). Possible persons, however, it is 
objected, cannot be said to have actual rights, for it is meaningless to confer rights on 
persons who do not exist (Macklin 1981, 151). As Richard DeGeorge categorically puts 
it: 
 
Future generations by definition do not now exist. They cannot now, therefore, be 
the present bearer or subject of anything, including rights. Hence they cannot be 
 said to have rights in the same sense that presently existing entities can be said to 
have them. This follows from the briefest analysis of the present tense form of the 
verb ‘to have’. (De George 1981, 159) 
 
In a similar vein, Beckerman declares that ‘properties, such as being green or wealthy or 
having rights, can be predicated only of some subject that exists’ (Beckerman 2006, 55). 
Stanley I. Benn even contends that it is a logical error to deduce actual rights from 
merely potential qualification for those rights. 
 
For if A has rights only because he satisfies some condition P, it does not follow that 
B has the same rights now because he could have property P at some time in the 
future. It only follows that he will have rights when he has P. He is a potential bearer 
of rights, as he is a potential bearer of P. A potential president of the United States is 
not on that account Commander-in-Chief. (Benn 1984, 143)6 
 
The absence of a certain property may arguably be overcome by means of the principle 
of potentiality. For instance, in the normal course of events, a human fetus or infant will 
sooner or later presumably acquire the capacity of rational and autonomous decision-
making (see e.g. Dagger 2006, 208). Yet in the case of future generations we are dealing 
with a ‘two-level potentiality’ which seems to present an insurmountable theoretical 
difficulty: a future person, as a merely potential being, first has to be conceived, and only 
then can obtain moral agency. The rights of future people, if they exist, are thus wholly 
contingent upon their coming into being (see Feinberg 1974, 66, Elliot 1989, 161–162). 
As Daniel Callahan writes: ‘The claim of future generations against us is a conditional 
                                                        
6 For a similar argumentation, see Warren (1977). 
 claim, in the sense that it depends upon their existing to make the claim’ (Callahan 1981, 
82). 
Two questions can be posed here. First, cannot we say that although there is no 
present holder of a right, but nevertheless, the right itself does exist now? According to 
Robert Elliot, it is not impossible that there be present rights which do not have present 
bearers (Elliot 1989, 161). Gosseries, however, convincingly demonstrates that this is an 
absurd hypothesis: it is inconsistent to maintain simultaneously that, on the one hand, a 
right exists now and that, on the other hand, the existence of this right depends upon the 
existence of someone in the future (Gosseries 2008, 453). 
The second question is purely rhetorical: what guarantees that future generations 
will come into being? Nothing, of course. Right now, their future existence is at best a 
‘realistic assumption’ (Gosseries 2004, 10) or a ‘well-based belief’ (Baier 1981, 174). 
Certainly, we do have a moral obligation to care for the existence and well-being of 
posterity, but it would be logically and conceptually untenable to grant the right to come 
into being to future persons on this ground, since their existence is a prerequisite for 
their having rights (see Feinberg 1974, 66, De-Shalit 1995, 116). 
 
 
4.2. The non-identity problem 
 
The ‘non-identity problem’ presents another fundamental philosophical challenge to the 
notion of the rights of future generations. The term itself was coined by Derek Parfit and 
it was him who gave its classical formulation. Parfit distinguished between different 
kinds of choices that can be made with respect to future persons. If we are making ‘same 
people choices’, the same future people will exist whatever we choose (Parfit 1984, 
 356). The so-called ‘different number choices’, on the contrary, affect both the identity 
and number of future people. When we are choosing between two social or economic 
policies, e.g. whether we decide to deplete or conserve certain natural resources, 
 
[i]t is not true that, whichever policy we use, the same particular people will exist in 
the further future. […] Since the choice between our two policies would affect the 
timing of later conceptions, some of the people who are later born would owe their 
existence to our choice of one of the two policies. If we had chosen the other policy, 
these particular people would never have existed. […] It is therefore not true that a 
choice like Depletion will be against the interests of future people. (Parfit 1984, 361, 
363) 
 
The ‘non-identity’ challenge has dominated the debates on intergenerational justice for 
several decades – perhaps, as Tremmel admits, too much (Tremmel 2009, 37). 
Contrary to the view that future persons cannot be harmed in the future by our 
present actions, Kristian Skagen Ekeli argues, as it seems to me rightly, that even though 
we may reasonably have doubts concerning some aspects of the epistemological and 
ontological status of unborn persons (whether we possess sufficient knowledge about 
the interests, needs and life-conditions of future people, and how much we influence 
their welfare, existence, identity and number with our actions and policies), this does 
not seriously compromise the moral status of future generations or preclude the 
representation of their rights or interests (Ekeli 2005, 443–444). Even such fervent 
opponents of the idea of the rights of future generations as Beckerman and Pasek 
concede readily that the objection that rights cannot be but rights of identifiable 
individuals is a ‘weak argument’ (Beckerman and Pasek 2001, 22–23). On a 
philosophical level, it is well arguable that 
  
the fact that future persons cannot be individuated or counted is a bad reason for 
thinking that present activity cannot or need not be based on assumptions about 
them. Activity is constantly taken on the basis of quite strong assumptions about 
others whom we cannot individuate (O’Neill 1996, 115). 
 
When owners insure their pieces of property assuming that unknown people might steal 
or damage them, or hotel-keepers assume that someone will book their rooms, etc., they 
proceed upon adequately accurate assumptions (ibid.). It should be noted that this 
statement does not prove in itself that rights can be attributed to future persons, only 
that present people can owe obligations to them. 
The legal perspective depends, at first sight at least, on our understanding of the 
meaning of the expression ‘rights of future people’. If we conceive them as ‘collective 
rights’, our ignorance concerning the number or kinds of future persons is completely 
unproblematic, inasmuch as the existence and the identity of a ‘community’ or a 
‘generation’ is to a great extent independent from that of its individual members. As 
‘group rights’, stresses Edith Brown Weiss, intergenerational rights exist regardless of 
the number and identity of the individuals making up each generation (Brown Weiss 
1990, 203): ‘since the rights of future generations exist only as generational rights, it 
does not matter who the individuals are or how many they may be’ (ibid., 205). And 
even granted that the rights of future persons are qualified as ‘individual rights’, the 
uncertainty related to the content of those rights is not due to the non-identity problem 
but to other factors, viz. our limited knowledge of future people’s needs and of the 
effects of our decisions on their life. 
 Therefore, in attributing rights to future persons, we can refer to them purely and 
simply as human beings, without regard to the question of which particular human 
beings they are, or to when and where they live (Meyer 2003, 146). This is possible 
because, as Annette Baier convincingly shows, the rights of future people are not person-
specific (Baier 1981, 172). In general, rights and obligations are possessed by persons 
not owing to their unique individuality, but in virtue of the roles they fill. For example, 
children qua children have obligations to and rights against their parents qua parents 
(ibid., 173). Likewise, Robert Elliot argues that the concern for the rights of future 
persons is impersonal: 
 
We are not striving to ensure that the rights of a specific set of people are not 
violated, rather we are striving to ensure that rights violations do not occur. 
Whoever comes into existence will have rights and it is the violation of the rights of 
individuals which we wish to avoid. (Elliot 1989, 163)7 
 
All this implies that if there will still be human beings five centuries from now, they will 
have rights, even if their identity is now necessarily obscure (Feinberg 1974, 65). 
 
 
5. Beyond the will/interest controversy 
 
Of the two philosophical challenges to the conceptualisation of the rights of future 
generations, the ‘non-existence problem’ looks thus more serious. As we have seen, the 
conclusion seems unavoidable that future people as purely potential persons can have 
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 no actual rights now, for there cannot be rights whose bearers do not yet exist. 
Consequently, it simply does not make sense to talk about the rights of future 
generations in present tense as Feinberg (1974, 65–67), Elliot (1989, 160–162), Baier 
(1981, 171–175) and Partridge (1990) occasionally do. 
As Gosseries points out (Gosseries 2008, 454), this still leaves two options for 
defending rights correlative with present obligations. One consists in remaining in the 
present and ascribing rights to present rather than future people. I cannot and do not 
intend to analyse this option at length here. Nonetheless, I believe that the fundamental 
problem with this otherwise plausible solution is that its scope is far too narrow: as 
rights are linked to the existence of their bearers, it cannot handle long-term 
environmental effects. 
The other option is to attribute future rights rather than present ones to future 
people. The non-existence argument does not say that actual future persons cannot be 
properly said to have rights (cf. De George 1981, 159, Macklin 1981, 152), so it ‘is not 
strong enough to disprove the idea that future people, if and when they exist, will have 
rights’ (De-Shalit 1995, 115). Gosseries differentiates between two kinds of 
‘contemporaneity claims’. While he accepts that it is reasonable to require that for a 
right to exist, its holder should also exist, he does not endorse as a cogent requirement 
that for an obligation to exist, its correlative right would already need to exist. On the 
basis of this distinction, he affirms that it is not inaccurate or nonsensical to speak of 
future persons’ future rights as correlative with our present obligations (Gosseries 2008, 
455). 
Lukas H. Meyer argues along very similar lines: 
 
 Claiming that we can violate future people’s rights now does not, however, imply 
that future people have rights now. That implication would hold only if it were 
contended that presently existing rights alone constrain present action. But we can 
safely assume, first, that future people can be bearers of rights in the future; second, 
that the rights they have will be determined by the interests they have then; and, 
third, that our present actions and policies can effect their interests. (Meyer 2003, 
145) 
 
This latter approach does not only appear perfectly viable, but it also brings the 
whole problem of the conceptualisation of the rights of future generations into new 
light. Up until now, when discussing the legal and moral status of future persons from 
the standpoint of the present, we have referred to them as merely potential human 
beings with at most potential rights, that is, without rights, for there do not exist purely 
potential rights. There can be only ‘conditional rights’, in the sense that when and only 
when a person will come into existence, he or she will have rights (Gosseries 2008, 456). 
The ‘futurist’ perspective, however, offers a completely different angle. In the future, a 
considerable number of present-day ‘potential persons’ will probably become actual 
persons, many of them ‘paradigmatic’ rights-holders having ‘real’ rights. 
The change of perspective to a ‘futurist’ point of view has another important 
consequence as well. If we transpose our problematic into the future, the will/interest 
dichotomy will lose much of its force and find itself relativised.8 It can be enumerated 
among the basic facts we surely know about unborn generations that future persons will 
be sentient, self-conscious moral agents with certain biological needs and the capacity of 
choice (Partridge 2001, 385). The answer to the question of who can be a rights-bearer 
                                                        
8 I am indebted to Miklós Könczöl for suggesting this argument. 
 will thus not depend too much on whether we adopt the ‘choice’ or the ‘benefit’ 
conception of rights. 
Since actual future persons, unlike non-existing potential persons, are able to make 
claims and free choices, it is not necessary to lean on such dubious arguments as, for 
instance, that which says that future generations can have rights now, for one need not 
make claims to have claims (Goodin 1985, 179 n 49). And, on the contrary, it is well-
founded to assert that the present generation’s obligation, grounded in the principles of 
intergenerational equity, to conserve options for future generations is correlative with 
future generations’ right to free decision (Brown Weiss 1989, 95). Accordingly, our 
present actions can equally constitute a violation of rights by encroaching upon the 
autonomy as by infringing the interests of future people. 
The relativisation of the difference between the ‘will’ and ‘interest’ theories manifests 
itself also in respect of the uncertainties concerning the representation of the rights of 
future generations. It would be hard to say whether the cognition of the wishes and 
desires or the needs and interests of future persons presents greater difficulty. 
Nevertheless, Gregory Kavka insists that in spite of our relative ignorance regarding 
future people’s wishes and interests, we can foresee with a high degree of certainty their 
basic biological and economic needs, the satisfaction of which will surely be a 
prerequisite of the satisfaction of their other desires and interests – whatever they may 
be (Kavka 1981, 111). He suggests an interesting analogy between our ignorance of the 
whishes and interests of future persons and a young man’s ignorance of the desires and 
interests he will have in old age: 
 
It is unlikely that a young adult will know in detail the goals and desires he will have 
in forty years: whether, for example, he will wish to spend his time travelling, doing 
 volunteer work, or drinking beer. However, he can believe with a high degree of 
confidence that his important needs and interests will include good health, adequate 
food and shelter, and security for his loved ones. (ibid., 112) 
 
It may even be argued, as does Callahan, that since we cannot peer into the future and 
divine exactly what future human beings will need and desire, or which ideals they will 
pursue, we should act on the assumption that their needs, desires and ideals will not be 
all that dissimilar from our own: ‘we must use our own and present understanding of 
human life as the basis for any projections into the future – no other is available’ 
(Callahan 1981, 80, 84). This is precisely what makes the representation of the rights of 
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